The Egyptian Battles of Qadesh (or Kadesh) took place between the forces of the Egyptian empire, under Ramses II, and the Hittite empire, under Muwatalli II, at the city of Kadesh on the Orontes River, of what is now the Syrian Arab Republic. The battle is generally dated to around 1274 BC. It was probably the largest chariot battle ever fought, involving approximately 5,000-6,000 chariots.

Background

Between c. 1400 and 1300 BC, there was a general destabilization of the region of the Djahy in Northern Syria. The Egyptian rulers showed almost no interest in this region until the end of the 18th dynasty when Horemheb, the last ruler of this dynasty, campaigned in this region. In the 19th Dynasty, Seti I (son of Ramses I) set out to restore the lost glory of Egypt to the days of the Thutmose kings.

He made an informal peace with the Hittites, took control of coastal areas along the Mediterranean, and continued to campaign in Canaan. A second campaign led him to capture Kadesh and Amurru. His son and heir Ramses II campaigned with him. However, at some point, both regions lapsed back into Hittite control.

Kadesh campaign

Ramses II ascended the throne after his father Seti I. In the fourth year of his reign, he marched north into Syria to recapture Amurru and to confirm his vassals’ loyalty and explore the terrain of possible battles. The recovery of Amurru was Muwatalli’s stated motivation for marching south to confront the Egyptians. Ramses’ army crossed the Egyptian border in the spring of year five of his reign and, after a month’s march, reached the area of Kadesh from the South.

Egyptian Battles

As Ramses and the Egyptian advance guard were about 11 kilometers from Kadesh, south of Shabtuna, he met two Shasu (nomads) who told him that the Hittites were “in the land of Aleppo, on the north of Tunip 200 kilometers away and that they were too afraid of Pharaoh to come south.” This was, state the Egyptian texts, a false report ordered by the Hittites to prevent the Egyptian army from drawing up to combat with the foe.”

Egyptian scouts then returned to his camp bringing two new Hittite prisoners. Ramses II only learned of the true nature of his dire predicament when these spies were captured, beaten and forced to reveal the truth before him. Under torture, the second group of spies revealed that the entire Hittite army and the Hittite king were actually close at hand.

In his haste to capture Kadesh, Ramses II committed a major tactical error. He increased the distance between his lead Amun Division and the remaining Ra, Ptah and Seth divisions, thereby splitting up his combined forces. When they were attacked by the Hittites, Ramses II complained of the failure of his officials to dispatch scouts to discover the true location of the Hittites and reporting their location to him.

The pharaoh quickly sent urgent messengers to hasten the arrival of the Ptah and Seth divisions of his army, which was still some distance away on the far side of the River Orontes.

Before Ramses could organize his troops, however, Muwatalli’s chariots attacked the Ra division, which was caught in the open and almost destroyed it. Some of its survivors fled to the safety of the Amun camp, but they were pursued by the Hittite forces.

The Hittite chariotry crashed through the Amun camp’s shield wall and began their assault. This created panic among the Amun troops as well. However, the momentum of the Hittite attack was already starting to wane, as the vastness of Egyptian camp forced many Hittite charioteers to slow their attack; some were killed in chariot crashes. In his account of the battle, Ramses describes himself as being deserted and surrounded by enemies.

The pharaoh, in the desperate fight for his life, summoned up his courage, called upon his god Amun, and fought valiantly to save himself. He personally led several charges into the Hittite ranks together with his personal guard, some of the chariots from his Amun division and survivors from the routed division of Ra, and using the superior maneuverability of their chariots and the power and range of Egyptian composite bows, deployed and attacked the overextended and tired Hittite chariotry.

The Hittites, meanwhile, who understandably believed their enemies to be totally routed, had stopped to loot the Egyptian camp and, in doing so, became easy targets for Ramses’ counterattack. Ramses’ action was successful in driving the Hittites back towards the Orontes and away from the Egyptian camp, while in the ensuing pursuit, the heavier Hittite chariots were easily overtaken and dispatched by the lighter, faster, Egyptian chariots.

Although he had suffered a significant reversal, Muwatalli still commanded a large force of reserve chariotry and infantry plus the walls of the town. As the retreat reached the river, he ordered another thousand chariots, the regiment consisting of the high nobles who surrounded the king, to attack the Egyptians.

However, as the Hittite forces approached the Egyptian camp again, the Ne’arin troop contingent from Amurru suddenly arrived, this time surprising the Hittites. Ramses had also reorganized his forces and, expecting the help, attacked from his camp. Pinned against the River Orontes, by the surrounding Egyptian forces, the Hittites not overtaken in the withdrawal were forced to abandon their chariots and attempt to swim the Orontes, where many of them drowned.

The next morning, a second, inconclusive battle was fought. Though Egyptian accounts claim that Muwatalli called for a truce, the Hittite records note no such arrangement. However, neither side gained the total victory. Both the Egyptians and the Hittites had suffered heavy casualties – the Egyptian army failed to break Kadesh’s defenses, while the Hittite army had failed to gain a victory in spite of what had earlier seemed like a certain success.

Aftermath

The Hittite king, Muwatalli II, continued to campaign as far south as the Egyptian province of Upi (Apa), which he captured and placed under the control of his brother Hattusili, the future Hattusili III. Egypt’s sphere of influence in Asia was now restricted to Canaan. Even this was threatened for a time by revolts among Egypt’s vassal states in the Levant, and Ramses was compelled to embark on a series of campaigns in Canaan in order to uphold his authority there before he could initiate further assaults against the Hittite Empire.

In his eighth and ninth years, Ramses extended his military successes; this time, he proved more successful against his Hittite foes when he successfully captured the cities of Dapur and Tunip, where no Egyptian soldier had been seen since the time of Thutmose III almost 120 years previously. His victory proved to be ephemeral, however.

The thin strip of territory pinched between Amurru and Kadesh did not make for a stable possession. Within a year, it had returned to the Hittite fold, which meant that Ramses had to march against Dapur once more in his tenth year. His second success here was equally as meaningless as his first since neither Egypt nor Hatti could decisively defeat the other in battle.

The running borderlands skirmishes were finally concluded some fifteen years after the Battle of Kadesh by an official peace treaty in 1258 BC, in the 21st year of Ramses II’s reign, with Hattusili III, the new king of the Hittites. This treaty, which is now on display at the Istanbul Archaeology Museum, is believed to be the earliest example of any written international agreement of any kind.